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Postcolonial criticism in the Chinese context has become too sensitive, 
almost irrational and sometimes even dangerous, particularly after the 
publication of Zhongguo keyi shuo bu [China That Can Say No] and 
Yaomohua zhongguo de beihou [Behind the Demonization of China], two 
provocative books that sophisticatedly blend political undertones and 
commercial features. Unrelated to and before the publication of these 
two books, in the mid-1990s, I was personally involved in the debate 
on so-called Orientalism versus Occidentalism in Mainland China. The 
task of this essay is to sketch the background of this debate, to try to 
explain why all of a sudden postcolonial criticism became such a heated 
topic on the Mainland. Then I will go on to discuss the challenges 
and problems that practitioners of postcolonial criticism are facing in 
Western academia today. The last part is to sketch a reconsideration of 
my previous work on this topic and a reply to various criticisms my col-
leagues and I have received while promoting postcolonialism in China.
It is generally agreed that since the last quarter of 1993, postcolo-
nial criticism has constituted a new trend in Mainland China, to quote 
a passage from the editorial of Wenhui dushu zhoubao [Wenhui Book 
Review Weekly] based in Shanghai, dated May 21, 1994:
About half a year ago, most of the reading public in Mainland 
China had no idea about who Edward Said is. But ever since 
Dushu (Reading) magazine published Zhang Kuan’s ‘Oumeiren 
yanzhong de feiwozulei’ [The Otherness in the Eyes of the 
Europeans and Americans] and other two related articles about 
Edward Said last September, a heated debate was ignited, which 
led to an intellectual shock. All of a sudden everyone is talking 
about Edward Said and postcolonialism. (my translation)
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Or, to quote another passage from the Sydney-based New Asia Pacific 
Review:
With over a decade of deployment as an academic trope, 
Orientalism has enjoyed an extraordinary career and has 
achieved the dubious status of an international intellectual 
cliché. In the case of Mainland China, however, Orientalism 
along with the deconstructive strategies of which it is a part, 
has a far more recent history, one that dates in particular from 
the early 1990s and the era of renewed nationalist debate. 
[…] One of the most energetic participants in this debate is 
Zhang Kuan, a specialist in comparative literature focusing on 
German studies. A graduate scholar in the United States, in 
recent years Zhang has been a key promoter of Edward Said’s 
writings on Orientalism in the Mainland. Zhang’s concerns, 
however, have not merely been those of an independent decon-
structionist. His promotion of Western theory has been part 
of an evolving political agenda. (Barmé “On Orientalism” 84)
Contrary to the claims in the foregoing passages, I was not the first 
one to introduce Edward Said to the Chinese reading public.1 As a 
matter of fact, there were critical introductions and review essays on this 
very sensitive topic before September 1993 written in Chinese by well-
known Chinese critics, to name a few, Chen Xiaoming, Wang Ning, 
Wang Yichuan, and Zhang Yiwu. Some of their works were written as 
early as in the late 1980s and also published in influential periodicals and 
academic journals such as Wenxue pinglun [Literary Review] and Wenyi 
yanjiu [Literature and Art Studies] in Beijing. But, as far as I know, no 
major responses or feedback are traceable. Aside from the works done by 
people in the Mainland China, there was abundant literature on or re-
lated to this topic written by overseas Chinese scholars, both in English 
and Chinese, for example, the debate on modern Chinese literature 
between Liu Kang and Zhang Longxi (English in Modern China and 
Chinese in Ershiyi shiji [Twenty-first Century]), Chen Xiaomei’s work 
on Chinese Occidentalism (which was written at Stanford Humanities 
Centre where Edward Said completed his book Orientalism) and Lydia 
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Liu’s study of the debate on Chinese national characteristics [guomin 
xing] during the May Fourth Period. In addition, non-Chinese China 
scholars in the West such as Arif Dirlik, Maurice Meissner and Masao 
Miyoshi had already contributed much to this field.
My first essay in Dushu (originally written as a semester diary for 
a core-seminar related to the new intellectual trend in America I had 
taken in the Humanities Program at Stanford University2) is a short one. 
With less than 6000 Chinese characters it contains the following parts:3
 1. A brief introduction to the French poststructuralist speculation on 
the relationship between representation and reality, discourse and 
power. 
 2. An explanation of Edward Said’s application of the theory above 
in his attesting to the distortion of the Arabic world by Western 
Orientalists.
 3. Following Said’s model, the essay reviews the historical change of 
China’s image over different time periods in major Western coun-
tries, arguing that no matter how positive or negative, up until 
today China’s image is still misrepresented in the West because the 
Western “social energy” needs such a image.
 4. The essay views the formation of the Chinese modernity discourse 
as a parallel transplantation of Western Enlightenment discourse, 
which contains colonial discourse, and holds that the mainstream 
of Chinese modernity discourse has always been enchanted 
by the magical spell of Western colonial discourse. The process 
of the formation of the Chinese modernity discourse, the essay 
argues, with its radical denial of the Chinese cultural heritage by 
native intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement through the 
late 1980s, is by and large nothing but a joining in the chorus of 
Western Orientalism. The essay further argues that, just as Western 
Orientalism has produced a distorted image of China in the West, 
Chinese Occidentalism also has always misrepresented the West, 
giving at times a too negative and unreal image of the latter. Much 
more frequently, however, Chinese Occidentalism has romanti-
cized and idealized the West. The Western colonial discourse has 
been deeply internalized in the Chinese modernity discourse and 
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the “West” exists only in the imagination of pro-Western Chinese 
liberal intellectuals (“Otherness” 3–8).
Since this essay generated a heated debate in Mainland China,4 I was 
asked to write a response. This second article in Dushu, entitled “Zaitan 
Saiyide” [“Edward Said Reconsidered”] replied to the criticism the first 
essay had generated and defended the above arguments (“Edward Said” 
8–16).
I wrote several more essays on postcolonial criticism, among which 
one was even published, quite out of my own control, in the Liaowang 
banyuekan [Watch-over Bimonthly] affiliated with the Xinhua News 
Agency. The essay in Liaowang, based on a talk I gave at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, embedded strong political undertones; it 
was widely quoted, and accordingly, received considerable criticism.5 
Below is the closing message of that lecture, a conclusion I now consider 
problematic: 
If we admit that modern Western humanities and social sci-
ences have been replete with colonialist discourse, we also have 
to admit that this has a deep influence within China itself. This 
is evident in the way in which we constantly accept what the 
West touts as moral standards and principles. We follow the re-
quirements and signals of Westerners in expounding on various 
aspects of specific Chinese problems. For some time, we have 
lacked the courage to challenge and check the Western hege-
monic and colonial discourse. One of the reasons we seem so 
passive when carrying out concrete negotiations with Western 
countries over issues like human rights, or intellectual prop-
erty rights in the market economy, is that we have not come 
up with a mode of exposition that completely casts off Western 
hegemonic discourse. Resistant literature, such as the works of 
Frantz Fanon, Chinua Achebe, or Aimé Césaire remain remote 
to us Chinese. None of their works, no matter how successful 
even in the West, has been translated into Chinese. Compared 
to the resistant discourse in other developing countries, be it 
in South America or India, Chinese resistant discourse seems 
147
Po s t co l on i a l  Cr i t i c i sm  in  Con t empor a r y  Ch ina
so weak these days. During the present age of Reform and the 
Open Door, a period in which the formation of a Chinese 
socialist market economy is enmeshing us within international 
practices, questions of how to preserve and uphold our own 
culturally constructed subjectivities, and how to reinforce iden-
tification with our own culture so as to enable victory in future 
international conflicts, rightly deserves serious consideration 
by all responsible Chinese intellectuals.6 (“Said’s Orientalism” 
36–37)
Any Western thought, I believe, in order to get accepted in China 
and become genuinely influential, requires both an optimal local and 
international climate. Edward Said published his influential books 
Orientalism in 1978 and Culture and Imperialism in 1993. My first 
review in Chinese was written in summer of that year and published in 
the fall. It was a year in which China felt deeply humiliated by Western 
hegemonic powers and especially by the United States in the interna-
tional sphere: the Cargo-Carrier Milk-Way incident and the Western 
blockade of China’s campaign for hosting the Olympic Games in 
2000. The boycott policy headed by the United States towards China 
in the early 1990s after the Tiananmen Square Incident already had 
created a significant backlash among once whole-heartedly pro-Western 
Chinese intellectuals. A new perspective from which to view the world 
was strongly desired and eagerly sought. The search for their own lost 
cultural identity and subjectivity became so high on the agenda for the 
Chinese intelligentsia at that moment, and an undercurrent of a re-
newed Chinese nationalism was developing. The time of transplanting 
postcolonial criticism was opportune (Fewsmith 115). The right topic, 
the right journal, the right chief-editor, the right reviewer and, most im-
portantly, the right timing together made the emergence of postcolonial 
criticism in China a tremendous success.
II. The Problems of Postcolonial Criticism in Western Academia
As is well known, most of the practitioners of postcolonial criticism 
in American academia are “masters” of poststructuralism. Since post-
structuralism is normally anti-essentialist, it is understandable that 
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the major ideas of postcolonial studies cannot be easily summarized. 
Edward Said did not give a specific definition of his much overloaded 
term Orientalism; he gave several definitions instead. But for me, the fol-
lowing comments offer the most enlightening description of Orientalist 
scholarship:
Yet the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting 
the Orient from something into something else: he does it for 
himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases he believes for 
the sake of the Oriental. This process of conversion is a disci-
plined one: it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, tra-
ditions, vocabulary, rhetoric, all in basic ways connected to and 
supplied by the prevailing cultural norms of the West. (Said 
68–69)
It will be hard to deny completely what Said points out here if we 
think of the various scholarly oriental associations and periodicals such 
as Münchener Ostasiatische Studien or Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 
in the West, as well as the organizations and events around them. As 
I argued in my first Dushu essay, Western Oriental scholarship always 
distances itself from the Chinese academic tradition that is supposed to 
be the very target of its intellectual pursuit. The relationship between 
Chinese scholarship and China scholarship in the West seems to be a 
parallel, rather than an integrating one, and quite often perspectives 
in Western scholarship on China with regard to its target seem to be 
made from a position of presumed superiority rather than self-awareness 
and self-critique. By making these statements, however, I am not pre-
tending to be the spokesman of Said for the Chinese audience. In my 
second Dushu essay, I also have made it clear that I did acknowledge 
the limits and the methodological dilemma involved in Said’s works. 
Whereas Said’s theory on Orientalism indeed could provide some new 
perspectives for Chinese intellectuals in viewing Western scholarship 
about Chinese culture, it certainly will become absurd if pushed even 
just one step further. For instance, Said blames the West for having mis-
represented the East, but his own philosophical groundwork preaches 
that language neither goes along with nor represents reality, henceforth 
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any representation eventually leads to distortion, or, to put in German 
and make it rhyme, “Darstellen ist immer Entstellen.” If the semantic or 
linguistic fallacy is something that no one is able to escape from when 
thinking and elaborating, where is Said’s legitimacy to condemn any 
Western Orientalist wrongdoings? Based on his own logic, his criticism 
of Orientalism will end up as nothing but a new kind of misrepresenta-
tion of other already existing old misrepresentations, not even one step 
closer to reality (Clifford 255–76). 
Facing the challenge with respect to whether he is able to present 
a real East, a true East, or whether a real and true East exists at all, 
Said’s answer is that this is not his task in the book and that it also 
goes beyond his interest and ability. Furthermore, as an anti-essentialist 
he is strongly against the dichotomy of East vs. West, believing that 
to define the nature of either East or West is equally meaningless. His 
postscript to the 1995 edition of Orientalism is entitled “East isn’t East” 
which, beside his repeated and enhanced reproach that Orientalism has 
provided a distorted image of the East, also implies that there is no such 
a thing as pure East or pure West (Wang Ning 58). Words and concepts 
he repeatedly uses are hybridity and ambiguity. For him, all cultures are 
“mixed-up.” He cautiously keeps a “critical distance” from the Islamic 
nationalism of the Arabic world, as well as from any institutionalized 
discourse, probably as a strategy for his own survival in the New York 
City. He claims that he counts on his critical consciousness and insists 
on always taking an “oppositional” position. Ironically, while advocating 
that a real intellectual should become a voice for the oppressed and for 
weaker social communities by deconstructing the norms and values of 
the mainstream, he refuses to identify himself with any social group.
The ambiguity within the very term “postcolonial” needs also to be 
addressed. The suffix “post” indicates “after” if referred to time, but it also 
implies “opposing” if referred to approaches. Having the first definition 
in mind, we will assume that both the colonial era and the time of colo-
nial discourse had been long in existence, and now are or must be “over.” 
But according to Arif Dirlik and Masao Miyoshi, it is far more accurate to 
define the contemporary era as the era of new colonialism rather than to 
define it as the era of postcolonialism, if one takes into consideration the 
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international capital flows which are constantly undermining the integri-
ty of a nation-state that was once considered autonomous. Furthermore, 
the ambiguity of postcolonial theory, with its gestures against dichoto-
mies and its insistence on the hybridity of any culture, produces a poten-
tial necessity conducive to current international capital flow. It is true 
that after World War II many formerly colonized nations won political 
independence and established their own independent states, but the 
legacy colonialism left behind is too strong to be completely eliminated. 
The whole infrastructure of the ex-master country has been oftentimes 
inherited or transplanted into the new institutional design because there 
is hardly any epistemological alternative under the domination of the 
grand narrative of Western Enlightenment discourse, especially in the 
post-cold war era of the 1990s when some over-confident scholars in 
the West were triumphantly announcing the very end of history. The 
political-cultural identities, lost during the colonial period, have not 
necessarily been re-established with the creation of independent nation-
states after World War II for many developing countries (Miyoshi 740).
Most of the postcolonial scholars in the United States came from 
the developing countries and prefer to label themselves with the term 
“Third-World critics.” The use of the term “Third-World critics” in-
stead of “postcolonial critics” is even more, or at least as plausible, as 
the use of the term “postcolonial criticism” (Dirlik 52–83). While it is 
true that many postcolonial scholars fall into the category of an ethnic 
minority in the United States, their ties with minority communities are 
frequently very loose, not to mention their plausible connections to the 
genuinely developing countries. Being mostly trained at Western col-
leges, the so-called “Third World” critics lack the authentic knowledge 
of the developing countries, and remain aloof from the cultural tradi-
tion their ancestors once lived in. Due to their educational background, 
the intellectual source of developing countries is scarcely accessible to 
them. Postcolonial criticism badly needs more voices from intellectuals 
living and teaching in institutions in developing countries. Postcolonial 
thinkers living and working in the West should be encouraged more 
willingly to return to and embrace their cultural roots in order to find 
more intellectual resources. It is encouraging to note that eminent 
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postcolonial scholars such as Spivak and Bhabha have tried successfully 
to develop and nurture closer contacts with their Indian colleagues, 
especially in recent years.
Biological factors, however, do not guarantee the status of a 
postcolonial scholar in the area of cultural studies. Neither does one need 
to be a white-Europeanmale in order to be an Orientalist in the sense 
of Said’s work. The developing countries do not constitute an entirety 
and cannot be easily represented in the Western world by certain ethnic 
minority scholars whose writings are mainly in the major European 
languages, languages which have exerted discursive power over other 
non-European languages in terms of the building-up of specific ideas. 
In the circumstances that ethnic minority scholars are accepted as the 
representatives of the developing countries in the West, the voice of the 
scholars living and teaching in their native countries is falling to the 
wayside. Another troublesome question one may ask further is whether 
even scholars living and teaching primarily in their native countries 
represent authentic voice of their culture since they are likely to come 
from privileged backgrounds. The most favourable position postcolonial 
critics might obtain from domestic “Third World” scholars cannot be 
more than just an interlocutor between the two worlds (Gates 452–71 
and Bhabha 40–66).
Said’s own lack of knowledge about the developing world is rather 
evident. Paradoxically, whereas Said’s methodological approach heavily 
relies on poststructuralism, his moral justification for rejecting colonial 
discourse is grounded mainly in Western Humanism. If Said is a good 
student of his mentor Michel Foucault, Humanism should be the very 
target he invokes an archeology of knowledge to deconstruct, as Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment 
critically engaged this idea. Said may have ignored the fact that the 
belief in the universal principle of humanity, of common human 
nature, was also the justification for many colonialists. One of the many 
complications of the concept of Humanism lies in the fact that Social 
Darwinism and Humanism once have been integrated and have set 
up the moral ground for the Western expansion in its colonial history 
(Clifford 255–76). Resistant writers such as Aimé Césaire and Frantz 
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Fanon both pointed out that within the very concept of the European 
Humanism there is anti-humanistic element, and the atrocities that 
Nazi Germany committed were just the practices of an anti-humanism 
that moved back from colonies and performed in Europe, whose roots 
were grounded in Enlightenment thought (Wilder 2005). This becomes 
evident in the confession monologue by a colonialist in Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness that Said himself keeps quoting:
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it 
away from those who have a different complexion or slightly 
flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look 
into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at 
the back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an 
unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and 
bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to …. (Conrad 10)
The idea emphasized here comes out of European Humanism, which 
has been used to underpin ideologies of “helping uncivilized people to 
become civilized.” The political practice that took place in Nazi Germany 
during the 1930s and 1940s, as some scholars have convincingly argued, 
is caught up in a logical development of Western Enlightenment 
thought (Wolin 20). In this passage and in the ensuing discussions on 
it in his Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, Said makes evi-
dent the complex interconnections of colonial practices and the ideal 
of Humanism, but fails to further analyze and challenge this concept 
from a broader point of view, which suggests that if postmodernist and 
postcolonial scholars completely cast off Enlightenment thoughts, they 
will end up undermining their own intellectual resources. 
III. The Predicament of Postcolonial Criticism in China
The primary interrogation addressed to Mainland Chinese postcolonial-
ists (if any) is their relationship with Chinese institutional discourse. 
Zhao Yiheng and Xu Ben in their reviews on the Mainland “post-
scholarship” (houxue) in the Hong Kong-based magazine Ershiyi shiji 
(Twenty-first Century) concluded that, unlike its Western source which is 
usually considered a liberal intellectual grouping, Chinese postcolonial 
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criticism proves to be both politically and culturally a rather conserva-
tive force. It also appears to be a one-edged sword, aiming mainly at 
an international target, but having no internal or national agenda, and 
therefore it is able to co-exist with the institutional discourse (Zhao and 
Xu 4–15). They are concerned that Chinese postcolonialism could be 
easily utilized by the right wing of the government, and see in it the 
danger of stimulating and encouraging a radical nationalism, which 
stands in the way of the nation’s effort to adapt itself to international 
norms. They condemn its “reactionary political function” (Xu 132–37). 
This position seems to be only the voice from a pro-Western liberal 
wing. The young Marxists, on the other hand, insist that the era of the 
nation-state is over, nationalism in developing nations has little chance 
in confronting international capitalism, which is so powerful and over-
whelming, and cannot be fought against effectively unless all developing 
countries are united internationally. They argue that postcolonial criti-
cism, by stirring up conservative nationalism, leads a righteous resist-
ance onto a hopeless track (Chen 6–7). The ultra-nationalists welcome 
the theory, but expect postcolonial critics to push it further, namely, 
to use it in critically scrutinizing the historical Orientalism shared by 
Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. The radical Chinese nationalists situate 
the worst legacy of Orientalism in Communism. Furthermore, they are 
concerned that this kind of thinking could be helpful to the secessionist 
movement of the Chinese ethnic minorities, or peripheral communities 
such as Taiwan and Hong Kong.7
Another interesting observation my Chinese liberal friends have 
made is that postcolonial thinking is of great significance, but only in a 
Western context. The location where the debate occurs is their primary 
concern. They argue that if Chinese scholars want to participate in the 
debate, they should write in major Western languages, and publish only 
in the Western world. A positive example they gave is the first genera-
tion liberal master Hu Shi who, according to them, always defended or 
even saluted Chinese cultural traditions when writing or lecturing in 
English overseas, but served as a commander in the battle against his 
own cultural tradition and domestic institutionalized discourse while 
in his homeland (Lei 16–20). They encourage Chinese “post-masters” 
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to follow their Western mentors in critically examining the tradition 
in which they grew up, in pursuing archeological studies on their own 
construction of knowledge.
The question lies for me herein could be formulated as such: What 
is this so-called Chinese institutional discourse? As a matter of fact, the 
contemporary Chinese institutional discourse consists of various ele-
ments that can be divided into mainstream and non-mainstream. My 
understanding is that the mainstream of the Mainland Chinese institu-
tional discourse is manifested in the new key words such as “adaptation 
to international norms,” “market economy,” “open door” and “reform” 
and so on, which are completely in accordance with the mainstream 
of the Western world and which I do not feel any urge to challenge.8 
The destiny of postcolonial criticism, whether in the West or in China, 
remains forever an oppositional voice. 
In addition, I would like to stress that the relationship between in-
stitutional discourse and various intellectual currents in contemporary 
Mainland China is much more sophisticated than one could imagine 
overseas. Not only does Chinese institutional discourse such as repre-
sented by Liaowang try to utilize some of postcolonial thinking, but 
also the general reading public shows great interest in this “new per-
spective.” The once liberal Dushu, the nationalist Zhanlüe yu guanli 
(Strategy and Management), the semi-dissident Dongfang (Orient), the 
unorthodox Tianya (End of the World ) and the popular Zhongshan 
(Purple Mountains)—all these magazines have participated extensively 
in the Orientalism vs. Occidentalism debate which greatly promoted the 
new nationalist sentiment in the mid-1990s when the nationalist wave 
rose so high that the government had to downplay it and keep it within 
its own control, or at least avoid being hurt by its intense vigour. At 
the same time, one must admit that postcolonial criticism in Mainland 
China (or elsewhere), unfortunately, cannot be completely apolitical, 
since it is not a form of traditional humanistic scholarship as defined by 
the European scholars in the early second half of the twentieth century.
A logical and appropriate question to raise here is why the so-called 
Chinese “post-masters” do not follow their western mentors in critically 
examining the tradition in which they grew up, in pursuing archeo-
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logical studies on their own knowledge genealogy (Wang Yichuan 148). 
Here my counter-argument is that since the May Fourth Movement 
in the early twentieth century, discourses about modernity have 
become a dominating tradition in the Chinese context. Fundamental 
concepts such as reason, development, progress, freedom, science and 
democracy have become so popular and deeply rooted in the hearts 
of the modern Chinese intellectuals that any analyses of them, in the 
slightest postmodernist sense, will surely end up either as impossible 
or even dangerous. To re-evaluate critically the heritage of the May 
Fourth Movement, for me at least, means exactly to re-examine our 
own cultural traditions—strong, alive and powerful traditions. Just as 
the European Reformation eventually altered and developed religion in 
the West, Chinese Enlightenment discourse can only be consolidated 
through a postmodernist subversion and deconstruction. 
Chinese postcolonial criticism has been charged with being “Anti-
West.” Depicting the rising identity consciousness in the Mainland, the 
cover story of Zhongguo shibao zhoukan [China Times Weekly] based in 
Hong Kong for its first issue of 1994 was entitled “Fan xifangzhuyi 
huichao” [“The Backlash of the Anti-Western Tide”]. This position is 
extremely misleading because a self-assertive China does not equal an 
aggressive China or, to quote Geremie Barmé, it is not a China that is 
“becoming increasingly irate about their (perceived) inferior position in 
the New World Order and the attitude of the United States,” and hence-
forth has a “desire for revenge for all the real and perceived slights of 
the past century” (Barmé 185). To challenge Western colonial discourse 
and to rethink a modern Chinese genealogy of humanistic knowledge 
is not to reject Western civilization as an entity. The best thing Chinese 
postcolonial criticism may contribute is to help provide an alternative 
perspective for China in its negotiation with the West, intellectually as 
well as politically. The crucial difference between liberal groups and the 
postmodernist groups among the Chinese intellectuals, it seems to me, 
lies in their ideas about contemporary China. Liberals view contem-
porary China as still caught in a pre-modern age and argue that China 
now needs Western Enlightenment thought, while postmodernists view 
China as already immersed in an international capitalist era. Both the 
156
Zhang  Kuan
liberal school and the postmodernist school are Westernized; probably 
the latter is more Westernized, and by no means should they be labeled 
as “Anti-Western.” 
Finally, I would like to end this article by sharing an anecdote. Several 
years ago after I finished presenting a paper on postcolonial criticism at 
a conference sponsored by the Volkswagen Stiftung in Trier University, 
Dr. Wolfgang Kubin, one of the leading China scholars in Germany, 
who was my mentor during my formative years, stopped me in the hall-
way during the break and said he strongly disagreed with me and could 
not accept that I brought the German sinological tradition into the 
Orientalist scope. He argued that the German sinological tradition was 
different from the French and English, for it has nothing, or very little, 
to do with the Western imperialist expansion project in Asia. However, I 
was able to come up with more supporting facts to back my position: for 
example, that the first German professorship for China studies was en-
dowed in the Colonial Institute in Hamburg, and the complications of 
the “scientific exploration” of China by the worldwide leading German 
geologist at the time, the President of Berlin University, Ferdinand Paul 
Wilhelm Freiherr von Richthofen, was linked to the German occupation 
over Qingdao during the last two decades before the World War I.9 My 
mentor confronted me with the following counter-argument: German 
China scholars devoted their lives to traditional Chinese wisdom. From 
Richard Wilhelm through Wolfgang Franke to Wolfgang Bauer and 
Guenther Debon, they all considered themselves loyal students of great 
Chinese philosophers, and they truly were. In a certain sense they are 
the carriers of Chinese cultural tradition and represent Chinese culture 
in the modern world. As for my case, if one may utilize Foucault’s theory 
of knowledge genealogy studies: I am a student of German literature 
and Western humanities, a practitioner of the Western postmodernist 
theories, soaked in the thoughts of German and European romanticists, 
Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault and others, representing exactly the Western 
imperialist tradition. How dare I start talking about German sinology in 
a slightest negative way? I believe this is not just my dilemma, but it is 
also indicative of the predicament of the Chinese postcolonial criticism 
in general. 
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Notes
 1 I myself became conversant in postcolonial thought in the late 1980s when I 
came to the United States to study at the graduate level. Before going “abroad” 
I had the chance to work a couple of years in a program called “Sinology in the 
West” [xifang hanxue yanjiushi] at the Institute of Literature, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, thus I was familiar with the history of China studies in the 
West. 
 2 I would like to use the opportunity to express my thanks to Professor Paul 
Robinson and Marjorie Perloff for their excellent co-instruction in the 
Humanities Program at Stanford in the academic year 1993–1994 which greatly 
enlarged my scholarly scope.
 3 Before receiving my essay, the chief-editor Shen Changwen already had two ar-
ticles about Said edited and ready to publish for the November 1993 issue. He 
added my article to that issue, and in addition, wrote a provocative editorial 
entitled “Are They Civilized?” [“Tamen wenmingma?”].
 4 In the 1980s, the West has been greatly idealized in China. Modernization 
equals Westernization was the typical way of thinking in that time period, as 
was represented by the TV series Heshang [The River Elegy]. My first Dushu essay 
helped to shift the Mainland intellectual trend. An internal source revealed that 
the debate the essay sparked, among other things, had helped the magazine’s 
circulation copies to increase from 30,000 for the year 1993 to 80,000 for 1994. 
The number for the year 1996 reached 120,000. An interesting new “tongue-
twister” reads: “You don’t need to read books but you really need to read the 
Reading” [“Shu shi keyi budude, ‘Dushu’ shi bukeyi budude”].
 5 That small essay became again and again the target of the fury of my Chinese lib-
eral friends. For them, it stands as an example of my moral defect or as evidence 
of complicity with institutional discourse. They called me, for instance in China 
News Digest, “Zhang Kuanqiao” instead of “Zhang Kuan,” referring to Zhang 
Chunqiao, the notorious Communist party ideologue during the Cultural 
Revolution. My Liaowang essay was “re-published” in the Americanbased online 
Chinese magazine Huaxia wenzhai [China News Digest, 1996.01.C], and caused 
controversy among overseas Chinese students. 
 6 The English translation is adapted and modified from Geremie R. Barmé's ar-
ticle “Orientalism” in the New Asia Pacific Review. I found out, very much to 
my surprise, however, that Barmé has changed (deliberately?) the meaning of 
my essay at several places in his translation which only enhanced my belief that 
Orientalism is still at work.
 7 There is no denial of the fact that my essay was published in Liaowang (an equiv-
alent of the American Weekly Standard), but it is also a fact that the column 
in which my essay was published in Liaowang is called “Zhenzhutan” [“Pearl 
Beach”], a name suggesting marginal value and entertainment, decorative at best 
but by no means representing the mainstream. Before its publication, the essay 
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had been put on hold for quite a long time because the editor was not quite sure 
whether it was in accordance with “institutional discourse.”
 8 This view is represented by Chen Ming, chief-editor of the influential journal 
Yuandao [Returning to Logos] and the circle around him. 
 9 See Richthofen, whose Chinese expeditions were funded by Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
and who also presented to the latter a special report about the strategic location 
of the Chinese coastal city Qingdao from a geologist’s perspectives. 
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